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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE idea of moral relativism has been much discussed of
late. This discussion, however, has not succeeded in distilling
the idea of moral relativism down to a single unequivocal set
of ideas. As a rough first approximation, moral relativism
involves the idea that moral right and wrong do not transcend
the beliefs of or standards set by some particular reference
group or community. However moral relativism is thought of,
it is unquestionably a phenomenon of substantial contemporary
influence.
The contemporary prominence of moral relativism has not
escaped the notice of either judges' or moral and legal theorists.2
* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. My thanks
to Professors Steven D. Smith and Donald E. Lively for their reactions to
this piece. Neither, of course, bears responsibility for any remaining defects.
For her useful research assistance, thanks are owed as well to Maryanne
Walser.
1. See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d
45, 57, 262 Cal. Rptr. 452, 465 (McDaniel, J., concurring), review granted,
782 P.2d 1139, 264 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1989); Johnson v. Huntington Beach
Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 62
(McDaniel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Pantely v. Garris,
Garris & Garris, P.C., 180 Mich. App. 768, 772, 447 N.W.2d 864, 868 (1989)
(referring to "the backdrop of a moral relativism that passes for intellectual
sophistication in contemporary America").
2. See Brandt, Relativism Refuted?, 67 MONIST 297, 301 (1984) (referring
to "how widespread relativism is today"); Taylor, Four Types of Ethical
Relativism, 63 PHiL. REv. 500, 500 (1984) (referring to "widespread accep-
tance" of moral relativism by educated persons in the twentieth century);
Wiles, Harman and Others on Moral Relativism, 42 REv. METAPysIcs 783,
783 (1989) (referring to defenses of moral relativism as "no longer unusual").
Cf. Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHM. REV. 163, 163 (1986) (morality commonly
treated as "subjective or conventional" in our secular intellectual culture);
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Justice Blackmun, for example, has argued that "[r]elativistic
notions of right and wrong . . . have achieved in recent times
a disturbingly high level of prominence in this country, both in
the guise of law reform, and as a justification of conduct that
persons would normally eschew as immoral and even illegal." 3
One might suppose that the influence of moral relativism,
however pervasive at lower judicial levels, has not yet significantly
influenced the Supreme Court. Legal manifestations of moral
relativism, or what we shall for convenience refer to as legal
relativism, would at first blush seem out of place in the
conservative jurisprudence of the contemporary Supreme Court.
The conservative emphasis on constitutional text and on the
framers' intent should work against relativism. We do not
ordinarily tend to think of the constitutional framers as completely
determined in their moral thinking by the developing strands of
cultural relativism of the Enlightenment, 4 and the text of the
Constitution itself does not ordinarily tend to suggest a relativist
interpretation as the preferred reading.' Particularly in light of
Unwin, Relativism and Moral Complacency, 60 PHIL. 205, 211 (1985) (referring
to "the loose subjectivism that forms such a notable part of our current
malaise"); Werner, Ethical Realism, 93 ETHICS 653, 677 (1983) ("moral
subjectivism" as the currently prevailing intellectual opinion). Alasdair MacIntyre
has referred to ours as an "increasingly emotivist culture." A. MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 343 (1988). For analogous observations
by legal theorists, see J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980) ("[Our
society .. . rightly does not . . . accept the notion of a discoverable and
objectively valid set of moral principles, at least not a set that could plausibly
serve to overturn the decisions of our elected representatives."); Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1712
n.206 (1975) ("Pluralist political theory may be regarded as a translation into
collective terms of the principle of subjectivity of individual values.").
3. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 765 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
4. A certain sympathy with the moral practices of other cultures is
detectable, for example, in MONTESQUIEU, THE PERSIAN LETTERS (G. Healy
trans. 1964) and D. DIDEROT, Supplement to Bougainville's "Voyage," in
RAMEAU'S NEPHEW AND OTHER WORKS 179-228 (J. Barzun & R. Bowen trans.
1964), but this hardly amounts to moral relativism in any thoroughgoing sense.
See C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSO-
PHERS 29-31 (1932). Cf. E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT
6 (1951) ("The eighteenth century is imbued with a belief in the unity and
immutability of reason. Reason is the same for all thinking subjects, all
nations, all epochs, and all cultures.").
5. We will at this point set aside such questions as whether interpreting
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Justice Blackmun's admonition quoted above, one would not
anticipate that moral relativism would detectably inform
contemporary Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence.
On the other hand, if moral relativism is in fact a deep and
pervasive cultural trend, it is difficult to imagine that it never
filters into and affects contemporary Supreme Court
constitutional jurisprudence.
This essay will argue both that legal relativism has in fact
influenced contemporary Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence, and that such influence will not tend to be
beneficial. The emphasis of this essay will be on the argument
that even if relativism cannot be technically refuted as a
philosophical doctrine, it offers a number of pragmatic
disadvantages, with no compensating advantages.
Establishing unequivocally the presence of legal relativism at
the Supreme Court will ordinarily be difficult for two reasons.
First, the underlying idea of moral relativism itself has been
defined in various ways, 6 and there is no guarantee that these
and applying a relativist constitutional provision necessarily must be done in
a relativist way, or whether a judge who does not subscribe to moral relativism
could recognize and apply such a relativist constitutional provision in a way
that is morally defensible without any reliance on the truth of moral relativism.
There is nothing particularly relativist about determining that a relativist
interpretation of a particular constitutional provision is jurisprudentially uniquely
and objectively correct.
6. For a sense of the diversity of understandings of moral relativism, see,
e.g., Carson, Relativism and Nihilism, 15 PrmosopmA 1, 1-3 (1984) (referring
to "many" versions of moral relativism, but settling on an understanding of
"[r]eta-ethical relativism [as] the view that there are moral issues about which
there is no moral judgment that is more correct than all other conflicting
judgments"); Devine, Relativism, 67 MONIST 405, 405 (1984) ("the essence of
relativism" taken to be "that reasoning is possible only given shared assump-
tions, and that there is a plurality of possible sets of assumptions between
whose adherents no argument is possible"); Harman, Is There a Single True
Morality?, in RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 363, 371 (M.
Krausz ed. 1989) ("Moral relativism denies that there are universal basic moral
demands and says different people are subject to different basic moral demands
depending on the social customs, practices, conventions, values, and principles
that they accept."); Moser, A Dilemma for Normative Moral Relativism, 26
S.J. PHIL. 207, 207 (1988) ("Moral relativism comes in various forms.");
Peterson, Remarks on Three Formulations of Ethical Relativism, 95 ETHICS
887 (1985) (discussing the varying formulations of Professors R.B. Brandt,
Bernard Williams, and Philippa Foot); Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?, in
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definitions are coextensive. Second, and more importantly, even
if we arrive at a clear and unequivocal understanding of what
we mean by moral relativism, it will often be difficult to
determine whether a given judicial judgment, interpretation, or
line of reasoning genuinely reflects moral relativism or not. A
judicial pronouncement with relativist overtones may not reflect
the judge's adoption of relativism, or his or her conclusion that
the Constitution in the particular instance requires or permits
relativism. For example, holding the single relevant moral truth
that pluralism, diversity, and tolerance are objectively called for
under the circumstances, quite apart from whether any community
or group-based moral norm or belief would so suggest, is not
moral relativism in spite of the relativist overtones.
RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 35, 37 (M. Krausz ed. 1989)
(presenting three distinct interpretations of relativism); Taylor, supra note 2,
at 500-05 (discussing four varieties of moral relativism); Unwin, supra note 2,
at 205 (distinguishing between less and more radical forms of moral relativism).
The ambiguity of the idea of moral relativism is illustrated by the fact
that while Professor Maclntyre, for example, has expressly dissociated himself
from moral relativism, A. MACINTYRE, supra note 2, at 364-69, it would not
be misleading to think of Maclntyre as in fact adopting a progressive but
tradition-based relativism. While Maclntyre's understanding of moral relativ-
ism is therefore underinclusive for certain purposes, other conceptions of
moral relativism are misleadingly overinclusive. Robert Bork, for example, has
referred to the putative "right not to conform, the right to dignity, and the
right to be left alone" as "expressions of rampant individualism and hence
of moral relativism." R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 246 (1990). The most that can be said is that an
increasing emphasis on individualism and human dignity may, at least in our
era, be somehow associated, perhaps psychologically, with the rise of moral
relativism. But as a matter of strict logic, one can certainly reject moral
relativism and still believe that the dignity of the individual person and the
most elemental human rights can somehow be shown to be universally and
objectively binding moral requirements.
Given the multiple ambiguity of the notion of moral relativism, this essay
will leave aside such philosophically intriguing, but less immediately decisive,
questions as the relationship between moral relativism on the one hand and
the doctrine of moral realism on the other. Compare, e.g., Sayre-McCord,
The Many Moral Realisms, 24 S.J. PHIL. 1, 13 (1986) (relativism as a non-
objectively based version of moral realism) with Note, Relativistic Jurispru-
dence: Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1471
(1986) (student Note of Professor Heidi M. Hurd) ("The most precious tenet
of moral relativism, the tenet that marks its fundamental ontological difference
from moral realism, is the metaphysical claim that the truth value of moral
propositions is relative to the beliefs of a discrete reference group.").
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While this essay need not, and will not, adopt any particular
definition of moral relativism from among the assortment
available, it may be helpful to offer some sort of rough typology
of some possible metaethical views, to help locate generally the
idea of moral relativism. Certainly this typology does not
necessarily correspond to anyone's, let alone everyone's, actual
usage of the terms. It may nonetheless be useful first to associate
what we might call "moral absolutism" with the idea that in
every problem of human choice affecting the interests or wishes
of others, there will be a uniquely and objectively morally right
or best choice. "Moral objectivism," in contrast, would make
the less ambitious claim that for most problems, one or more
possible choices will be objectively morally better than others,
for reasons independent of the moral norms or beliefs of some
particular community or group.7 "Moral relativism," of course,
would emphasize the dependence of moral right and wrong upon
the moral norms or beliefs of some particular community or
group of persons. What might be called "moral subjectivism"
would be simply a limiting case of moral relativism, in which
the reference group or community is reduced to one person, the
speaker or moral evaluator. This of course does not imply that
moral subjectivism would tend to be just as effective as an
instrument of social coordination and control as moral relativism.
In this typology, moral absolutism, moral objectivism, moral
relativism, and even moral subjectivism would share a belief
that some possible courses of conduct are in some sense morally
right and others morally wrong. All these approaches would
differ from the view holding false all claims that a given course
of conduct is morally right on the one hand,8 and from moral
noncognitivism on the other, which would hold that moral claims
are not the sort of thing that can be true or false in any
7. It should be noted that a moral objectivist might believe that some
such possible courses of action are objectively morally better than others,
without knowing or even considering to be knowable, in a particular case, the
moral status or value of any particular choice. Metaphysics is a separate
question from epistemology, in the sense that there might be unknown or
unknowable objectively morally right answers. For the distinction between
metaphysical and epistemological claims in this context, see Note, supra note
6, at 1421 n.8.
8. John Mackie is sometimes interpreted as adopting this view. See J.
MACKIE, ETICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).
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substantive, traditional sense. 9 While these logical distinctions
between various sorts of moral cognitivism and noncognitivism
can be drawn, there is of course no guarantee that some forms
of moral cognitivism, such as moral relativism, will either be
logically consistent and coherent or that they will in a given
historical context be stable and efficacious over the long term.
Ultimately, then, this essay will call into question not the
logical consistency or technical acceptability of legal relativism,
but what might be called its distinctive pragmatic attractiveness.
The essay aims not at a strict refutation of logical relativism,
but at exposing what most ordinary persons would consider the
significant practical disadvantages, risks, and uncertainties
associated with legal relativism, along with the surprising lack
of clear potentially compensating practical advantages.
The essay will briefly document the surprising paucity of
philosophical support for a genuinely thoroughgoing relativism.
Again, to show that few relativists are thoroughgoing relativists
is hardly to refute relativism, but such a showing does tend to
establish the initial center of intellectual .gravity, which may be
relevant to any ultimate pragmatic judgment we may care to
make. The essay then considers the unattractive and apparently
unavoidable limitations on the scope of moral discourse imposed
by moral relativism. From there, the essay discusses the literature
focusing upon relativism's dubious value in distinctively resolving
the twin problems of tolerance and intolerance of the actions
and beliefs of other persons. Finally, the essay more broadly
discusses the question of relativism and the uncertainty,
disputedness, diversity and plurality of normative moral claims
and beliefs. The essay finds no grounds for preferring moral
relativism, or for thinking it logically unavoidable, that are
sufficient to negate its pragmatic costs.
All this would be academic from the jurisprudential standpoint,
however, if the courts, and in particular the contemporary
Supreme Court, were uninfluenced by and did not engage in
legal relativism. While, as we have suggested, the unequivocal
detection of legal relativism is usually difficult, some progress
9. Twentieth century emotivism would appear to fit neatly within this
category. See A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1946); C.L.
STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); J. URMSON, THE EMOTIVE THEORY
OF ETHICS (1969).
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can be made. The section immediately below examines in
particular the Rehnquist Court precedent of Pope v. Illinois,0
a 1987 case discussing the elements of obscenity, and concludes
that despite Justice Blackmun's strictures quoted above,' the
contemporary Supreme Court has not avoided the temptations
of legal relativism. This, in turn, makes our consideration of
legal relativism below, and the essay's eventual pragmatic rejection
of legal relativism, all the more important.
II. POPE V. ILLINOIS AND THE DETECTION OF LEGAL
RELATIVISM
In Pope v. Illinois, 2 the Rehnquist Court sought to clarify a
point of law left unresolved in the well-known obscenity case
of Miller v. California)3 It will be recalled that in Miller, the
Court had imposed the following three-part test for obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether
"the average person applying contemporary community stan-
dards" will find that the work taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.' 4
It had been settled by the time of the Pope case that the first
two elements of this test, appeal to prurient interest and patent
offensiveness, were to be determined with ultimate reference to
contemporary community standards. 5 The principal issue in
10. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
12. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
13. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
14. Id. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))
(citations omitted).
15. 413 U.S. at 24, 30 (discussing the prurient interest prong); Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (determining that "the jury must
measure patent offensiveness against contemporary community standards").
See also United States v. Obscene Printed Matter, 668 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.
Mass. 1987) ("The first and second prongs of the Miller test . . . are to be
decided with reference to contemporary community standards."). As the
government bears the burden of proof on all three elements, id., the Miller
formulation implies that if the government cannot show that sufficiently clear
community standards exist, as it may not be able to do, the material is
constitutionally protected. See State v. Kam, 68 Haw. 631, 633, 726 P.2d 263,
265 (1986).
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Pope focused on the proper method, under the free speech
clause of the Constitution, of determining the third, or "serious
value" prong.
The petitioners in Pope had argued at trial that the third or"serious value" prong of the Miller test should be determined
not on the basis of reference to contemporary community
standards, but "solely on an objective basis."'' 6 This argument
was rejected at the trial level in favor of recourse to the standards
of ordinary adults throughout the state of Illinois.' 7 The Rehnquist
Court, through Justice White's opinion for the majority, held
that the trial court's instruction to apply contemporary community
standards in determining the presence or absence of "serious
value" in the allegedly obscene material was unconstitutional. 8
The essence of the Court's discussion on "serious value" ran
as follows:
"The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole,
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regard-
less of whether the government or a majority of the people approve
of the ideas these works represent." Just as the ideas a work
represents need not obtain majority approval to merit protection,
neither, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, does the
value of the work vary from community to community based on
the degree of local acceptance it has won. The proper inquiry is
not whether an ordinary member of any given community would
find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in alleg-
edly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would
find such value in the material, taken as a whole. 9
16. 481 U.S. at 499.
17. Id. The Court in Miller had permitted, but not required, selection of
the entire state of California as the relevant "community" insofar as the
obscenity inquiry required recourse to community standards. See 413 U.S. at
30-34. The courts have substantial latitude in further restricting the size and
scope of the relevant community to a more local, idiomatic "community" as
variously defined. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974);
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); United States v. Bagnell, 679
F.2d 826, 835-36 (11th Cir. 1982) (jury instruction applying contemporary
standards of Dade County, Florida not erroneous for failure to include nearby
Fort Lauderdale), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983).
18. 481 U.S. 497, 501 (1987).
19. Id. at 500-01 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973))
(citation omitted).
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In a footnote, the Court added that "the mere fact that only a
minority of a population may believe a work has serious value
does not mean the 'reasonable person' standard would not be
met.,"20
Now, it is undeniable that the Court does not generally
confront-and does not do so in Pope-a philosophical question
distilled to laboratory purity, or a question to be answered by
recourse to philosophy unconstrained by the Constitution. The
options available to the Court under the Constitution and under
Miller did not reduce precisely and unequivocally to a choice
between relativist and objectivist methods of determining
obscenity cases. Consider, for example, the possibility that some
communities would, when asked to apply local community
standards to a determination of value, conclude that local
community standards themselves would require recourse to the
standards of a broader community, or even to what the
community conceived of as distinct, objective standards. Nor
would the Court necessarily focus on relativism versus objectivism
if it were concerned essentially with the degree of tolerance to
be accorded allegedly obscene materials.
Making all due allowance for the fact that constitutional
opinions are not unconstrained essays in metaethics, it is still
possible to discuss responsibly the roles of relativism and
objectivism in the Court's adjudicatory process. The Court
apparently wanted to begin its analysis in Pope with something
like the premise that a work could have the requisite serious
value even though a community failed to perceive or recognize
that value. Actually, even this premise would not serve as a
general criticism of relativism, in that it is perfectly possible for
a relativist to recognize that her own community may wrongly
apply or interpret its own community standards, or even that
the community should be guided not by its own actual standards,
but by what those community standards would be as modified
by due and informed deliberation.2 The Court's analysis is
perhaps a bit casual in declining to distinguish between a
community's disapproving of the ideas expressed in a work and
20. Id. at 501 n.3.
21. For discussion of the view that relativism does not necessarily license
whatever the relevant group or community currently happens to believe, see
Unwin, supra note 2, at 205-11.
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the community's failing to perceive the requisite sort of value
in the work.22 It would seem quite natural to disagree with the
substantive argument of a political treatise, while conceding its
value. For example, most contemporary readers of Thomas
Hobbes' Leviathan would not "approve of the ideas ' 23 expressed
in the work. Few, however, would deny that the work has
serious political value.
The Court's analysis in Pope seems to grope, if a bit
awkwardly, toward a recognizably objectivist or expert-based
analysis of the "serious value" prong. It will be recalled that
the Court held that "[t]he proper inquiry is not whether an
ordinary member of any given community would find serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in allegedly obscene
material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value
in the material, taken as a whole." 2 4 While this formulation is
less than entirely felicitous, it is sufficiently determinate to
indicate the general thrust of the Court's thinking.
It should first be noted that at no point does the Court
countenance any differences in approach to ascertaining the
presence of any of the four different sorts of serious value
(artistic, literary, scientific or political). An argument could be
made, one supposes, that artistic value is less objective, or more
community-relative, than scientific value. It might be thought
that communities could reasonably dispute the serious artistic
value of an item of art in a way that would seem implausible
if the issue were the scientific value of the work of Newton or
Maxwell. Of course, this example itself does not control for all
of the relevant factors. In any event, the Court did not address
the possible view that some forms of value are more community-
relative than others.
The Court focused on a distinction between the determination
of an ordinary person applying that person's own group
standards, and the determination of a reasonable person. On
initial inspection, there might seem little to choose between these
tests, especially if it is borne in mind that the community
standards referred to in the first formulation may be as broad,
diverse, and heterogeneous as those of the entire state of
22. See 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 500-01.
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California 25 or Illinois. 26 The Court, though, may have had two
differences in mind. First, while "ordinariness" and'reasonableness" are sometimes virtually synonymous in the
law, 27 the Court's switch from the language of an ordinary
person to that of a reasonable person may have been intended
to more clearly legitimize recourse to the views of presumed
experts on literary, artistic, political, and scientific value. Second,
the Court may have sought to mandate reference to the views
of an idealized person who has been abstracted from any
community, or whose views are not dependent upon the views
on the precise question at issue held by any community.
Independence of morality from the views of any particular
community or group is, as we have seen, at least strongly
suggestive of a repudiation of moral relativism. 21
The inference that the Court had both the "recourse to
expertise" and the "independence of community" notions in
mind is strengthened by the Court's observation that "the mere
fact that only a minority of a population may believe a work
has serious value does not mean the 'reasonable person' standard
would not be met." ' 29 The Court may have been driving at
something like an "expertise-based veto" of obscenity
prosecutions, based solely on expert testimony on the third, or"serious value" prong. The Court explicitly held open the
possibility that "prevailing local views" on a work's value may
not be reasonable. 0 The views of the people of the entire state
of California or Illinois may, on this reading, be constitutionally
irrelevant if contrary to the evidence of an independent critic.
The Court in Pope did not explicitly address the problem of
resolving conflicting expert testimony in this area. It is at least
25. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973).
26. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499 (1987). For the view that"reasonable person" standards and "entire state community" standards will
be practically identical, see id. at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Consider, for example, the standard of ordinary or reasonable care,
as applied by ordinarily prudent or reasonable persons, in the common law
of tort negligence. See, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW oF TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984). For a careful
exposition of the multiple senses of reasonableness of belief, see R. SWINBURNE,
FAITH AND REASON 45-54 (1981).
28. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
29. 481 U.S. at 501 n.3.
30. Id.
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logically conceivable for a widely recognized expert to conclude
that a particular work lacks, say, serious artistic value. What is
to be done, judicially, if her colleague differs? Both, presumably,
could be reasonable persons in this context.' The problem of
division among experts looms largest in some of the most
important cases.
Unfortunately, the opinion of the majority in Pope is not
particularly clear at this point. The Court carefully asserts that
the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person "would" find
the requisite value in the work.3 2 The Court repeats in a footnote
that the legal standard must focus on whether a reasonable
person "would" differ with presumably less tolerant local
community views.33 Without putting undue literalistic pressure
on the Court's language, one is inclined to conclude that if
reasonable persons, or experts, differ in a particular case, it
cannot be said that a reasonable person "would" find the
requisite value. If we assume, as we must, that the Court
intended a liberalizing, speech-protective test, we are led to
wonder why the Court did not simply substitute "might" or"could" for the logically much more demanding "would. '3 4
It is possible that the Court majority avoided the obvious
language-that a reasonable person might or could find the
necessary serious value-because of their own less than robust
faith in the objectivity of such value determinations, or because
31. For the view that a shared quality of reasonableness among evaluators
does not guarantee unanimity or agreement, in a separate free speech context,
see American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv.,
830 F.2d 294, 314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
32. 481 U.S. at 501.
33. Id. at 501 n.3. Note that Justice Blackmun's separate opinion, doubtless
intended to be strongly speech-protective, oddly uses weak language to the
effect that "even a minority view among reasonable people that a work has
value may protect that work from being judged 'obscene."' Id. at 506
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
34. This problem, by the way, could not have been overlooked by the
Court majority, as it was explicitly called to their attention by Justice Stevens.
See id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is possible, since the burden of
proof on all three prongs of the Miller test remains on the prosecution, see
United States v. Obscene Printed Matter, 668 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass.
1987), that the Court majority intended that the material be protected unless
the prosecution could show that no reasonable person would ascribe the
requisite serious value to the work in question. If so, this intention was
expressed with less than exemplary clarity.
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of their fear that relativism and subjectivism in such matters
were not subject to sufficient judicial control. The Court may
in particular have feared that the answer to the question "could
a reasonable person find serious artistic value in the work in
question" will always, or nearly always, be yes,35 or at least
that the contemporary inclination to think so would not be
judicially controllable. This is at least legal relativism, if not
subjectivism, and the spectre of legal relativism, therefore, cannot
be exorcised even from the apparently objectivist approach taken
by the Pope majority to the third element of the Miller test.
The influence of legal relativism is clearer, certainly, in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Pope, and in the majority's
own continuing disinclination to rethink the strongly group-
relativist analysis of the first, or prurient interest, prong of the
Miller test. The overall impression one is left with is that the
contemporary Supreme Court has inherited an understanding of
obscenity with strong and controversial relativist and subjectivist
influences, and that the Court has declined to reshape that
understanding so as to repudiate such relativism and subjectivism.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Pope is intriguing in
several respects. Justice Scalia concurred on the theory that the
opinion of the Court reached a result faithful to the logic of
Miller,36 but urged a reexamination of the Miller standard,
essentially along relativist or subjective grounds.37 Justice Scalia
explicitly equated the Court's "reasonable person" test of the''serious value prong" with an "objective" test,3" and argued
35. Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946) ("What seems
to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring value.").
This conclusion is reached, at least with regard to literary and artistic value,
by Justice Scalia. 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also
Kucharek v. Hanaway, 714 F. Supp. 1499, 1510 (E.D. Wis. 1989) ("Long
before deciding Miller, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that indivi-
duals' perceptions of what constitutes literary, artistic or educational value
will inevitably vary widely.").
36. See 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also American Postal Workers
Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294, 323 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Bork, J., dissenting) (concluding that a "reasonable reader" standard
is far more predictable and less subjective than the standards of appellate
judges at the time of the writing in question). An apparent equation of"reasonable person" and "objective" standards is made in Kucharek v.
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that at least with regard to questions of literary and artistic
value, such matters amounted merely to disputes about personal
taste.3 9 In this context, Justice Scalia maintained, "the fabled'reasonable man' is of little help in the inquiry, and would have
to be replaced with, perhaps, the 'man of tolerably good taste'-
a description that betrays the lack of an ascertainable standard."°
Justice Scalia concluded that "we would be better advised to
adopt as a legal maxim what has long been the wisdom of
mankind: De gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no
use arguing about taste, there is no use litigating about it." '41
The tendency on the part of Justice Scalia and others to
equate reasonableness and objectivity is perhaps understandable,
but in this context is clearly mistaken. The idea of reasonableness
itself is not unequivocal. 42 But on most understandings, reasonable
decisionmaking, or the reasonableness of the decisionmaker, do
not guarantee anything like objectively correct decisions.4 3 A
person may be thought reasonable in acquiring certain amounts
of specified kinds of relevant evidence and reasonably applying
reasonable rules of inference in forming a belief, but that belief
may turn out to be plainly, demonstrably, objectively false. A
belief in the impossibility of travel to the moon was reasonable
a century ago. Only a person who was well-informed and who
was thinking with logical rigor could fully appreciate the
reasonableness of such a belief. Such a belief could hardly
qualify, however, as in any sense objectively true.
It seems fair to conclude from our examination thus far of
Pope that neither the majority opinion nor those of the remaining
Justices can be adequately accounted for without reference to
Hanaway, 714 F. Supp. 1499, 1510 (E.D. Wis. 1989) ("Like the other terms
set forth in Miller, 'educational' can be applied objectively under a reasonable
person standard.").
39. See 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987)-(Scalia, J., concurring). Cf. id. at 506
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Reasonable people
certainly may differ as to what constitutes literary or artistic merit.").
40. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
41. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens,
joined in relevant respects by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun,
adopted a similar relativism or subjectivism of value determinations. Id. at
512-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1711 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
43. See R. SWINBURNE, supra note 27, at 45-54.
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the pull of contemporary relativism and subjectivism. This is
perhaps unsurprising. Even then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, in
the role of theorist, concluded some time ago that "[t]here is
no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you
that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments
of your conscience, and vice versa."" But the influence of legal
relativism is also evident not only in what Pope does, but in
what it does not do, or in what it leaves alone and unquestioned.
In particular, Pope does not challenge the clear relativist, and
perhaps even subjectivist, elements that have pervaded the judicial
understanding of obscenity since Miller. Whether we think of
the "serious value" inquiry mandated by Pope as influenced by
relativism or not, it is clear that the first two prongs of the
Miller test, referring to "prurient interest" and "patent
offensiveness," remain essentially a matter of recourse to group
or community valuational standards.45 In a federal system, such
determinations would be relativist on their face.
Yet it is important to appreciate that a relativist interpretation
of, for example, an appeal to a prurient interest in sex is hardly
inevitable. Prurience has been defined by the Court as involving
an appeal to a "shameful or morbid interest in sex,' 46 and the
Court has clearly and explicitly sought to distinguish in this
context between what it referred to as "normal, healthy sexual
desires ' 47 and, presumably, abnormal or unhealthy sexual desires.
Now, it is quite possible to interpret these concepts, and
particularly that of shamefulness, in a group or community-
relative way. What is shameful might amount to no more than
what some relevant reference group considers to be shameful.
But it is also perfectly possible to think of terms such as
healthiness, morbidity, and even shamefulness in ways that at
least partially transcend reference to group norms. It is at least
possible to conceive of something as, perhaps, universally,
44. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
704 (1976).
45. See United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 n.7 (E.D. Va.1987). That the standards are to be group-relative, and not merely personal
to each decisionmaker, or in our sense "subjective," is recognized in United
States v. Obscene Printed Matter, 668 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1987).
46. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985) (citing
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
47. Id. at 498.
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objectively, "really" healthy, or, more simply, as healthy whether
such healthiness is recognized or not.
Such an objectivist approach is at least a logically possible
option. And it is vital, in ultimately making the choice, to avoid
assuming that relativist interpretations of sexual healthiness or
morbidity must, in the spirit of the Constitution, be broadminded,
tolerant, expansive, and generally libertarian, while objectivist
interpretations of sexual healthiness must be narrow, restrictive,
and generally repressive. As we shall more broadly note below,
there is certainly no necessary association between relativism
and tolerance, or between objectivism and intolerance. 48 It is
perfectly possible to conclude that the proper understanding of
sexual healthiness is an objective understanding, and that the
substance of such an objective understanding is libertarian.
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently adhered to a
relativist, or community standards-based, interpretation of the
prurient interest and patent offensiveness prongs of the test for
obscenity. 49 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion either that the
Supreme Court has simply chosen the course of moral relativism
in this respect, or that the Court thinks, correctly or incorrectly,
that the Constitution or the binding case precedents themselves
objectively mandate applying the logic of relativism in this
context. Whether the Constitution itself not only permits, but
requires, that issues of obscenity be decided in a relativist way
seems generally doubtful,50 but this is an issue we may for
present purposes set aside. In any event, the influence of legal
relativism on contemporary Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence makes our consideration below of the merits of
legal relativism of inescapable importance.
48. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. For a recent statement
in another context of the values of pluralism and tolerance, see Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2351 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also United States
v. Obscene Printed Matter, 668 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1987) (applying
community standards on the first two Miller elements, and then going on to
determine, under the third, or "serious value" prong, that the "reasonable"
person in the United States is unable to read Swedish photograph captions,
thereby implying that bilingual Swedish-Americans are, in this context, other
than reasonable).
50. For an "originalist" start on these issues, one might begin with the
sources cited supra note 4. For a sense of the early Enlightenment awareness
of the observed variability of moral codes, see P. HAZARD, THE EUROPEAN
MIND 288-89 (1968).
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III. Is LEGAL RELATMSM EXPEDIENT?
Relativism, it seems fair to conclude, is to one degree or
another entrenched in at least some segments of contemporary
Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence. This section
therefore poses a question that makes up in practical importance
what it lacks in technical philosophic elegance: Is legal relativism
a distinctively good thing, even from the standpoint of many
of those most initially sympathetic to its apparent advantages?
Again, one hardly refutes legal relativism by exposing features
of legal relativism that tend to be unattractive to even the
doctrine's sympathizers, or by exposing its apparent advantages
as largely illusory. Our aim, though, is not to refute legal
relativism, but, by displaying its unattractiveness, to promote a
thinning of the crowd in its tent.
A. The "Weakness" of Academic Moral Relativism
It may be surprising, in this age of relativism, that the number
of widely reputed contemporary moral philosophical relativists
who could reasonably be called "strong" or "thoroughgoing"
relativists is quite small. Certainly, most of the best-known
academic relativists would not so qualify." Professor Gilbert
Harman's well-known and gradually developed theory of moral
relativism, for example, is explicitly confined to what Harman
refers to as "an important class ' 52 of moral judgments. Harman
wants to apply relativist standards to judgments such as that a
person "ought not to have acted in a certain way or . . . that
it was right or wrong of him to have done so."" While this
might initially suggest a repudiation of moral objectivity, Harman
immediately specifies that, for reasons that need not detain us
here, his "relativism is not meant to apply, for example, to the
judgment that someone is evil or the judgment that a given
institution is unjust." 5 Presumably, this is the sort of judgment
51. This phenomenon was pointed out at least with regard to two leading
contemporary academic exponents of moral relativism, Bernard Williams and
Gilbert Harman, by Professor Heidi M. Hurd in Note, supra note 6, at 1505.52. Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND
MoRAl. 189, 189 (M. Krausz & J. Meiland eds. 1982).
53. Id. at 190.
54. Id.
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we ask the courts of law to make in appropriate cases. As well,
Harman's relativism does not apply to the judgment, say, that
a given action was morally wrong, or that it is morally wrong
that there be so much of that particular kind of action.55 As to
the comparative plausibility of moral relativism and what he
refers to as "moral absolutism," Professor Harman has
diffidently concluded that "I see no knockdown argument for
either side.'' 5 6
A similar, if not precisely parallel, restraint is displayed by
other leading academic moral relativists. The well-known
contemporary philosopher, Professor Philippa Foot, for example,
is willing to concede the objective immorality of certain actions
while maintaining the modest claim that there are some moral
issues, even if the number of such issues is unclear,57 on which
there is irreducible moral disagreement. 8 Similarly, ProfessorDavid Wong is attracted to the principle of "the unconditional
acceptance of equal human worth," 5 9 and recognizes the rational
solubility of some unspecified percentage of moral
disagreements 0 Professor Wong's reiterated claim that "there
is no single true morality ' 61 is, as we shall briefly discuss below,
certainly compatible with a view of the moral world that is
strongly objectivist in character.
Professor Richard Brandt's well-known theory of moral
relativism similarly builds on certain common, if not universal,
forms of human good and of moral offense,62 and ultimately
55. Id. at 192. See also Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and
Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227, 228 (1982) (discussing Harman's distinctions in
this respect).
56. Harman, Is There a Single True Morality?, in RELATIVISM: INTERPRE-
TATION AND CONFRONTATION 363, 385 (M. Krausz ed. 1989).
57. See Foot, Moral Relativism, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL,
164, 164 (M. Krausz & J. Meiland eds. 1982).
58. Id. at 163.
59. D. WONG, MoRAL RELATIVITY 9 (1984).
60. See Wong, On Moral Realism Without Foundations, 24 S.J. PHiL. 95,
95 (1986) ("many moral disagreements are irresolvable"). I shall at this point
simply assume that the presumed fact that at least some moral disputes arenot rationally resolvable counts strongly against any theory of the objectivity
of morals, though this is certainly contestable.
61. D. WONG, supra note 59, at 1; Wong, supra note 60, at 95.
62. See R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 242 (1979);
Brandt, Relativism Refuted?, 67 MoNIsT 297, 305-06 (1984).
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suggests that even those moral issues we now regard as most
intractable, including those typically presented in one fashion
or another to the courts of law, may have a single right and
consensually achievable answer. 63 A somewhat different, but
ultimately no more ambitious, version of limited moral relativism
is offered as well by Professor Bernard Williams. 64
It seems fair to conclude that the most plausible versions of
moral relativism make striking, if not disarming, concessions to
moral objectivism. 65
B. Relativism and the Evacuation of Moral Language
The willingness of advocates of moral relativism to make
concessions is not surprising. For even those with strong relativist
inclinations in some contexts will unavoidably tend to find the
language of moral relativism inadequate in other contexts.
Relativism sets limits to moral and jurisprudential discourse to
which most of us do not consistently adhere. The result is that
the advocates of moral relativism are not always true to their
own standards.
It does not matter whether we choose to call this an argument
ad hominem or not. Some ad hominem arguments are essentially
personal and ultimately trivial, but others are not. The argument
that the relativist ultimately finds relativism inadequate is of the
latter sort. It is not merely that our moral heroes transcend
63. See R. BRANDT, supra note 62, at 241-43; Brandt, supra note 62, at
306.
64. See Williams, The Truth in Relativism, in RELATIVISM: CoGNrrlvE AND
MoRAL, 175, 183-84 (M. Krausz & J. Meiland eds. 1982) (distinguishing
between situations of genuine, as opposed to merely "notional," confrontation
between moral systems).
65. In addition to the instances discussed above, one might consider in
this context the conclusion of Professor J.L.A. Garcia that what he takes to
be one of the most cogent versions of moral relativism "is logically compatible
with theses that philosophers have seen as expressing the view that morality
is not 'relative,' but 'objective."' Garcia, Relativism and Moral Divergence,
19 METAPHILOSOPHY 264, 274 (1988). The interesting, if controversial, argument
has been made that one unavoidable limit on the extent to which our moral
beliefs can be only relatively true is that if we encountered a set of beliefs
and practices too thoroughly divergent from our own, we would most reason-
ably infer not radical moral disagreement, but either our misunderstanding
of, or the non-moral character of, those foreign beliefs. See Cooper, Moral
Relativism, 3 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHI. 97, 101 (1978).
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relativism, though this is clearly true. We cannot, for example,
imagine a Nelson Mandela, a Bishop Tutu, a Natan Sharansky,
an Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or a Vaclav Havel observing sagely
that what is right for the South African regime, or the KGB,
or the Czech Communist Party bureaucracy may not be right
for those they oppress. 66
More importantly, the logic of moral relativism, to the extent
that it does not simply accommodate moral objectivism, bars
us from making moral judgments we reasonably feel entitled to
make. 67 We are not content, and have no reason to feel we must
content ourselves, with hunting for internal inconsistencies within
Nazism or racism, or looking merely for factual errors underlying
such ideologies, or merely pointing out, say, that the principles
of Nazism "are inconsistent with those of our ethical tradition." '
Even after Professor Harman, for example, has made his
concessions to objectivist morality, it remains true that he has
left moral language unnecessarily hobbled. In Harman's view,
given a person who faces a choice between saving or not saving,
at some minimal personal cost, a number of innocent lives,
where the potential rescuer has no other direct or indirect short
or long-term stake in the consequences of or reactions to the
choice, we are disabled from saying precisely that the person
would do moral wrong in choosing not to effect the rescue. 69
C. Relativism and Moral Practice
The fundamental problem with moral relativism, though, is
not simply its constriction of our language, but its recognized
and unrecognized indirect long-term effects on moral-and legal-
practice. It is not difficult to imagine that a society experiencing
66. For a sense of the indispensability of an objectivist language of morals
to Havel's message, see, e.g., V. HAVEL, POLITICS AND CONSCIENCE (1986);
Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS 23 (J.
Keane ed. 1985).
67. For a statement of this point with respect particularly to the relativism
of Professor Bernard Williams, see Note, supra note 6, at 1493.
68. Sapontzis, Groundwork for a Subjective Theory of Ethics, 27 AM.
PHIL. Q. 27, 35 (1990).
69. For relevant background on Harman's theory, see Wiles, supra note
2, at 787-88. The example in the text happens to be of a putative "positive"
as opposed to "negative" moral duty, but is just as easily stated, and just as
true, in the latter sorts of cases.
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an evaporation of the perceived objectivity of morals and the
development of distinctive group-based relativist moralities will
tend to be less legally governable. 0
No doubt this process may have positive and progressive
elements, including a relaxation of oppressive uniformity, but
loss of governability has negative elements as well. Most of us
are reluctant to abandon the idea that morality should function
not only to legitimize the claims of established and evolving
groups, but also to regulate and at least occasionally restrain
the assertion of group-based interest.7 It is implausible to imagine
that a group-based morality would in practice tend to distinctively
foster group self-restraint, or to inhibit the development of a''zero-sum" gaming mentality to the extent that even most of
the groups involved would tend to think desirable. It is admittedly
technically conceivable that a thoroughly relativist society could
consist entirely of numerous groups with partially conflicting
interests, where every single group adopted, for itself, a morality
of appropriate sacrifice and restraint by the group itself with
respect to its dealings with other groups. Such a state of affairs,
however, does not seem likely or stable in practice.
Relativism thus cannot offer much of what we want a morality
to be able to do, including the principled, satisfactory resolution
of inter-group conflicts. This is exhibited in section D below,
which discusses relativism's utter indeterminacy in the face of
the question of tolerance. But it should not be assumed that
relativism would likely provide a solid, stable foundation for
the satisfactory72 resolution of moral disputes within the relevant
groups. At least in our own historical context, there is no
obvious reason to suppose that moral relativism is likely to"work" in a satisfactory way over the long term even within
the particular group in question.
70. Cf. Frankena, Is Morality a Purely Personal Matter?, 3 MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PML. 122, 129-30 (1978) ("It seems clear that, where there is no
prevailing moral code, a legal system will have very hard going, even in
totalitarian countries.").
71. But cf. Harman, Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics, 3 MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PHuM. 109, 115 (1978) ("Morality is ... continuous with politics.").
72. By "satisfactory," I mean to exclude any moral code whose stability
is purchased through coercion, narrow indoctrination, or any high technology
version of thought control.
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The practical instability, in our historical circumstances, of
any satisfactory moral relativism is obviously not subject to
rigorous logical demonstration. It is tempting to think of
relativism, or today's common arbitrary mixture of objectivism
and relativism according to the tastes of the believer, as a sort
of psychological way-station between a moral objectivism of the
past and a succession of moral subjectivism, moral
noncognitivism, and eventual moral entropy in the future." For
present purposes, though, we need not make a claim of this
breadth.
The less ambitious, but still admittedly unprovable, claim that
should be made is that relativism will tend to be inadequate
even for conflicts within any particular group because relativism
is not, as a matter of logic and psychology, very good at
something we want a morality to be good at. Specifically,
relativism is not very good, in the long run, at changing minds,
changing behavior, and influencing even fellow group members
to regularly act contrary to their untutored inclinations or their
perceived, immediate interests. 74
One writer has summarized the point by arguing that
moral judgments and moral considerations have a considerable
influence on human affairs. They often influence people's attitudes
and actions. It is doubtful that they could have this kind of causal
efficacy unless they purported to be objectively correct. Why, for
instance, should a man's judgment that it is wrong for him to
continue to expect his wife to do all the housework cause him to
change, unless he took it to imply that his attitudes are incorrect? 5
Of course, acceptance of a moral judgment as objectively correct
hardly guarantees that we will be motivated to act in accordance
73. For a brief discussion of the instability in practice of sophisticated
versions of moral pragmatism, see R.G. WRIGHT, TrE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH
LAW 255-65 (1990).
74. This point certainly need not exhaust the function of morality, and it
need not be taken to imply that morality is solely and exclusively a functional
institution. We need not be what Professor Sayre-McCord refers to as "moral
instrumentalists" to appreciate this point. See Sayre-McCord, supra note 6,
at 5.
75. See Carson, supra note 6, at 17.
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with that judgment.7 6 The problem can be restated in terms of
why one would form, or continue to adhere at some cost, to
the moral judgment in the first place.
On an objectivist analysis of the housework example quoted
above, it may be simply, inescapably, morally wrong, hence
wrong overall (or with all relevant factors duly considered) to
expect one's wife to do all the housework. 77 If so, the husband
is simply bound, despite his interests or inclinations, until he
changes his situation or that of his wife in some objectively
morally relevant and sufficient way; e.g., by his taking a second
job to pay for a third party's professional cleaning services. On
a noncognitivist analysis, on the other hand, it is neither true
nor false that the husband should lift a finger. The view that
he should is no more objectively reasonable or required than
the view that he should not. Merely prudential considerations
and force of habit aside, why, as a matter of reason, should a
husband continue to adhere to any moral rule with no particular
linkage to truth or moral reality, if it is inconvenient to do so?
It may be thought that moral relativism, as opposed to
noncognitivism, is made of sterner stuff. At the very least, a
fellow group member could inspire or chastise the husband on
the grounds that the morality shared by their group required
helping with the housework. It would be simply, inescapably
true that group members in good standing, perhaps for reasons
enumerated by the group's moral code, help with the housework.
But this response merely raises the problem of group definition,
group jurisdiction, and defection. If there is an objectively true
morality binding all persons, or all human or rational beings,
no one within its scope can necessarily simply opt out. One
cannot, rationally, step aside and adopt some other set of moral
conventions, foreswearing the burdens and benefits of objective
morality. Relativism, however, has a much tougher time with
the problem of largely self-interested defection. What is irrational
or inconsistent about the husband announcing that, at least on
this occasion, he is to be considered not as a member of Group
76. For a thorough discussion of a number of issues bearing on moral
judgments and motivation, see D. BRINK, MoRAL REALISM AND THE FOUN-
DATIONS OF ETHICS (1989).
77. We are at this point setting aside as an unnecessary complication the
possibility of objective but merely prima facie or defeasible moral obligations.
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A, which believes in sharing household responsibilities, but as
a member of some other relevant Group B, which does not?
After all, each of us belongs to many partially overlapping
groups and communities."' Our membership in some is easily
alterable, in others not. Even among those groups or communities
in which group membership is difficult to change, such as those
of geography, social class, or ethnic group, there may well be
conflicts. All may have something to say about housework. Why
not simply announce that for household maintenance purposes,
one will henceforth look to the norms of a group defined, say,
by arguably relevant gender, class, regional, and age norms
under which household assistance by the husband may be optional
or episodic? Someone who makes this choice is not giving up
morality in general, or relativist morality in particular, or
demanding to know why he should be moral. He is simply
opting for the apparently relevant norms of one arguably relevant
group over those of another.
Now, it is possible that groups more sympathetic to the
interests of the wife, and to which the husband has at least in
some sense belonged, may question the propriety of the husband's
choice. They may point to their rules about defection from the
particular group, or about group membership generally, or about
what to do in cases of conflicts with group norms endorsed by
other groups to which their members may also belong, if theyrecognize the possibility of multiple group membership. The
husband may inescapably be violating some of those rules. But
his situation may be such that he cannot avoid violating some
such rule of some group of which he considers himself a
member. And we must ask, more generally, about those
identification, exit, and conflict rules of each particular group:
are such rules binding only for, or within, the group itself, and
not objectively rationally binding? If so, they are of little use.
Why not defect from these rules as well? If, on the other hand,
these sorts of rules are thought to be objectively binding, we
need some account of how normative moral relativism squares
with objective boundary-maintenance rules about when to follow
one rather than another set of apparently conflicting moral
rules.
78. See Lyons, Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence, 86
ETHICS 107, 110 (1976).
[Vol. 22
LEGAL RELATIVISM
D. Relativism and Tolerance
Thus far, it would seem, moral relativism has shown itself to
be of perhaps surprisingly limited general appeal. It might be
argued, though, that relativism somehow offers compensating
advantages. Some, if not all, of history's villainously intolerant
personages would have subscribed to moral objectivism in one
form or another. It therefore might be supposed that whatever
its disadvantages, moral relativism offers us a special likelihood
of the degree or kind of tolerance, in practice, that most persons
would find appropriate.
On the contrary, it is fair to say that there is no distinctive
or determinate relation between moral relativism on the one
hand and tolerance, noninterventionism, or moral laissez faire
in general. It may be true, as Professor David Brink argues,
that relativists cannot regard normative moral attitudes differing
from their own "as mistaken, provided those attitudes reflect
the moral beliefs of those who hold them or perhaps, the moral
beliefs of the group of which those who hold them are
members." 7 9 On this view, intolerance among relativists cannot
logically be due to their belief that those with opposing normative
beliefs are mistaken, at least in their consistent, factually well-
grounded moral beliefs. But intolerance need not be grounded
in perceived falsity of an opposing belief. Intolerance can just
as well be grounded in the belief that it suits one's own individual
or group interest to be intolerant. If intolerance is not thought
objectively wrong, why not pursue a course of intolerance within
a group, or with respect to opposing groups, as long as it seems
prudent or amusing to do so?
Relativist intolerance is therefore not likely to be an ardent,
passionate intolerance, but one born of uninhibited, uncharitable
individual or group interest or other motivation. It is possible
to argue that one of these types of intolerance is worse, in our
historical context, than the other, but we could not make a
definitive judgment on whether objectivism or relativism in
general tends to accommodate better our sense of the proper
role of tolerance without knowing much more; we would need
to know the degree of propensity for intolerance, or the frequency
of intolerance, under relativism. Also to be factored in, of
79. See D. BRINK, supra note 76, at 92.
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course, would be any incidence under moral relativism of
tolerance where most of us think tolerance would be
inappropriate. For instance, there is nothing in principle to
prevent the relativist from determining that what is right for
one society may not be right for Stalinist Russia, or Hitler's
Germany, or South Africa.
Ultimately, the relationship between relativism and either
inadequate or excessive tolerance is utterly indeterminate in
principle. More particularly, relativism does not provide a
distinctively natural and accommodating home for tolerance of
the right sort. As Professor David Brink has observed, "neither
noncognitivism nor relativism seems to have any special
commitment to tolerance. If no one moral judgment is any more
correct than another, how can it be that I should be tolerant?" 80
This is not to suggest, of course, that the history of moral
objectivism has been the history of either overflowing or
appropriate tolerance. But there is certainly no obvious reason
why a believer in the objectivity of morals, such as John Milton8 1
or John Locke82 and their successors, cannot consistently counsel
tolerance. There are any number of reasons for a moral objectivist
to adopt strong principles of tolerance. Among the most obvious
would be inevitable human fallibility, factual ignorance, a concern
for individual human dignity or equality, sensitivity to context
and to the act of moral choice itself by persons, and a concern
for the role of love or empathy in an objectively true morality.
Of course, any given moral objectivist might reject all of these
possible grounds for tolerance. But the issue at this point is
whether relativism can, in light of its disadvantages, be
rehabilitated, and the issue of tolerance offers no clear reason
for preferring moral relativism.
80. Id. at 93. See also Devine, supra note 6, at 407 ("Relativists need be
no more tolerant than others, and have special reasons for being intolerant.");
Hocutt, Must Relativists Tolerate Evil?, 17 PHIL. F. 188, 197 (1986); Williams,
supra note 64, at 173 ("If we are going to say that there are ultimate moral
disagreements between societies, we must include, in the matters they can
disagree about, their attitudes to other moral outlooks."); Note, supra note
6, at 1464.
81. See J. MITON, AREOPAGITICA (C.E. Vaughan ed. 1951).
82. See J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in JOHN LOCKE ON
POLITICS AND EDUCATION 17, 24 (1947).
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E. Relativism, Moral Variety, and Moral Disputedness
One possible response to all of the frankly pragmatic sorts of
arguments sketched above is to remind us that a doctrine such
as relativism may be true even if it is not advantageous or even
attractive. This is doubtless an important point. It is not,
however, susceptible to being explored within the compass of
this essay. We should spend at least a moment, however, on
the commonly held thesis that the sheer uncertainty, variety,
and the continuing disputed truth or falsity of normative moral
claims tend to impeach objectivism, and that on that basis,
relativism is more probably true.83
Certainly, some of the most familiar observations made by
relativists in this context seem plausible. Sometimes, there seems
to be no further standard by which to adjudicate between
competing normative moral claims.84 A case of some sort can
be made on the grounds that "different people are subject to
different basic moral demands depending on the social customs,
practices, conventions, values, and principles that they accept," 85
that "many moral disagreements are irresolvable," 86 and that
"there is no single true morality." '8 7
One of the most useful objectivist responses at this juncture
is not to deny such phenomena as the persistence of unresolved
moral disputes, but to deny that insofar as they describe real,
observable phenomena, they constitute a reason for preferring
relativism to objectivism. It may well be that mainstream
objectivist moral theories can account just as naturally and
plausibly for what is true in the claims about variety and
contestedness in moral practice as can moral relativism.
83. For a number of arguments questioning the sufficiency of unalloyed
moral objectivism, see, e.g., Loder, Moral Skepticism and Lawyers, 1990
UTAH L. REv. 47, 68-77. Referring at least to particular kinds of theories of
moral objectivism, Professor Frank Snare has concluded that "for many
purposes our rough, intuitive, common sense notions are sufficient to tell us
that the empirical diversity alleged by some anthropologists, at least, is quite
sufficient to undermine serious claims about a moral sense or moral secondary
qualities." Snare, The Diversity of Morals, 89 MIND 353, 354-55 (1980).
84. See Devine, supra note 6, at 409.
85. Harman, supra note 6, at 371.
86. Wong, supra note 60, at 95.
87. Id.
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Moral objectivism is compatible with a recognition of
individualism and the diversity of actually adopted moral codes,88
and with the view that moral judgments must be "relativized"
to the relevant circumstances or context to which the judgment
is to be applied.89 Furthermore, moral objectivism need make
no claim that every agonizing moral quandary must have a
single knowable best answer. A recognizably objectivist morality,
or a morality that is, for example, as objectivist as science, 9°
need not deny the persistence of moral conflict of opinion,9'
and need not claim uniqueness or universality for true moral
beliefs in an unnecessarily strong sense. 92
An objectivist morality may, to begin with, not be utterly
boundless in its determinate scope. Even a distinctively theistic
objective morality, for example, may not speak to all possible
sets of choices that might otherwise be thought to pose a problem
of moral choice, if, for example, neither of the two particular
concrete options have significant implications for salvation, or
if both of the two options have the same implications. There is
no reason to suppose that an objective morality must guarantee
88. See Wiles, supra note 2, at 794.
89. See Sapontzis, Moral Relativism: A Causal Interpretation and Defense,
24 AM. PHIL, Q. 329, 329 (1987); Wachbroit, Correspondence: Relativism and
Virtue, 94 YALE L.J. 1559, 1562 (1985).
90. Note that we need not conclude that physics as a whole has become"relativist," or "subjectivist," or "noncognitivist," even when contemporary
quantum physicists find what they take to be inherent indeterminacy, beyond
merely practical human unknowability, in certain properties of subatomic
particles. For useful discussions of the extent to which many quantum physicists
assume the indeterminacy of particular properties of particular particles, see,
e.g., J. BELL, SPEAKABLE AND UNSPEAKABLE IN QUANTUM MECHANICS (1987);
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF QUANTUM THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON BELL'S
THEOREM (J. Cushing & E. McMullin eds. 1989); P. GIBBINS, PARTICLES AND
PMAIRoxES: THE LIMITS OF QUANTUM LOcIC (1987); J. POLKINGHORNE, THE
QUANTUM WORLD (1984); SYMPOSIUM ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICS
(P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt eds. 1985); d'Espagnat, The Quantum Theory and
Reality, 241 Sci. AM. 158 (Nov. 1979); Teller, Relational Holism and Quantum
Mechanics, 37 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 71 (1986); Wright, Should the Law Reflect
the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. - (1990). For a brief discussion of the relation between moral
and scientific realism and indeterminacy, see Miller, Ways of Moral Learning,
94 PHIL. REV. 507, 509 (1985).
91. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 887.
92. Cf. Wong, supra note 60, at 95 ("there is no single true morality").
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that in every close call, or in every tragic choice, all answers
except one must be definitively illegitimate. It is even possible
for an objective morality to accommodate the fact that fallible,
ignorant human beings may in at least rare cases face such high
information costs in ascertaining a sufficiently specific ultimately
best moral principle that the information costs eventually swamp
the limited difference in the moral value of, say, the two best
choices under the circumstances. Consider, for example, the
question of to which of two worthy charities one should donate
one's five dollar bill-if one decides not to divide the money.
In fact, there is no reason why even a theistic objective
morality could not suppose that God would endow human
beings, individually or as groups, with perhaps even the maximum
degree of moral law-making capacity compatible with God's
nature, qualities, and works, and with the status of humans as
subordinate, created beings. Some minimal degree of diversity
of moral belief could well enter at that point. Whether, for
example, it is morally better to do volunteer work with local
hospitalized persons or with a local soup kitchen may not have
a single universally true answer, applicable to all alike. This is
of course not to argue that the actually correct, objectively true
theistic morality can accommodate such elements, merely that
some possible objective theistic moralities can.93
Nor should the falseness of moral objectivism be inferred
from arguments concerning the purported absence, or slowness,
of worldwide progress toward uniformity of moral belief.9 Even
if we assume that the objectivity of morals implies that there
should be gradual convergence in moral belief, it is hardly clear
how one would establish that there has been no or insufficient
moral progress or convergence of moral belief. The historically
longstanding and widespread institution of slavery has been as
nearly abolished as any defunct scientific theory. Free and open
elections among a broadly and equally enfranchised electorate
are much more common today, across much of the world, than
even fifty years ago. Even issues on which persistent disagreement
is notorious, such as the propriety of the death penalty, can be
93. For relevant discussion, see B. LONERGAN, INSIGHT 668 (1957); R.
SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 185-87, 199 (1979).
94. For discussion, see Railton, supra note 2, at 195; Wellman, Ethical
Disagreement and Objective Truth, 12 AM. PHIL. Q. 211, 211-14 (1975).
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seen to be narrowing in scope over time, as the class of crimes
for which the death penalty is thought appropriate by almost
anyone has been dramatically reduced. How one is to take
account of these and other examples, along with instances to
the contrary, is left mysterious by relativists using this argument
against objectivism.95
The situation is further clouded by the fact that the moral
objectivist might well predict decreasing convergence or
uniformity of moral belief in an era such as ours. Ours is a
post-colonial world, in which the false or at least premature
homogenizing effect of classical colonialism and territorial
imperialism arguably has recently been reduced, even while there
has doubtless been some homogenization attributable to Western
economic institutions and the pervasiveness of Western mass
media. But to these perhaps countervailing factors one might
add the increasing disparity, in absolute terms, of income and
wealth between rich and poor societies. 96
All in all, it seems difficult to argue definitively that the
nature or degree of moral dispute that we observe is incompatible
with any sort of moral objectivism. It is still perfectly possible
for the moral objectivist to offer to account for the persistence
of moral disputes on grounds compatible with moral objectivism.
For one thing, there is simply more at stake in the question of
what is a fair income tax rate than in, say, how we should
characterize the polarization of a photon along a particular axis;
and what is at stake are largely conflicting basic interests. 97 Thus
persistent moral dispute may reflect not only such factors as
"lack of imagination in seeking out arguments," 9 but unusually
strong "temptations to irrationality and lack of perseverance. ''99
95. Note that if the question of whether objectivism is falsified by moral
variety and persisting dispute is not practically decidable, the "default"
position with which we are left is a recognition of the overall pragmatic
unattractiveness of moral relativism, as discussed at length above in Section
III.
96. See P. BERGER, THE CAPIrrALIsr REVOLUTION 32-33 (1986) (contrasting
economically developed societies with traditional and underdeveloped societies
in a qualitative, experiential way).
97. See Wellman, supra note 94, at 212.
98. Devine, supra note 6, at 417.
99. Swinburne, The Objectivity of Morality, 51 PHIL. 5, 11 (1976). Note
also that even if the doctrines are utterly false, the twentieth century popularity
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To agree that despite what one's own group says, one ought to
give up one's slaves, is to commit oneself, potentially, to a
painful long-term sacrifice. We should expect various forms of
long-term resistance to the major premise, just as we should
expect more resistance to an improved scientific theory from a
scientist who has built her career on a contrary view than from
an equally expert scientist with no practical or emotional stake
in the matter. Of course, even if it is possible to convert an
individual slaveholder, for example, there remains a broader
class of slaveholders with strong common interests that persist,
via continually changing membership, over long periods of time.
The objectivist account of moral variety and persisting moral
dispute thus relies chiefly on obvious, undeniable features of
human inclination and human society. Nor is this objectivist
account simply a contrived, ad hoc response to the rise of
modern moral relativism. Standard, traditional objectivist
morality has long appreciated the phenomenon of continuing
diversity of moral outlook.' °° Given the difficulty of showing
the inadequacy of such accounts, we are left once more, as an
unavoidable conclusion, with the unattractiveness of moral
relativism.
IV. CONCLUSION
The appeal of relativism, whether in the college dormitory or
in judicial chambers, is not difficult to understand. It seems, at
of relativism, subjectivism, and noncognitivism may in some small measure
itself help to account for the persistence, in new guises, of some old moral
arguments, in that they provide new sources of resistance to asserted moral
imperatives.
100. For example, Thomas Aquinas recognized that "all men are not agreed
as to their ultimate end" and that tastes vary considerably. T. AQUINAS,
TREATISE ON HAPPINESS qu. 1, art. 7. Aquinas observes that sometimes "a
universal principle known by understanding or through some science, is
perverted in a particular case by some passion." T. AQUINAS, TREATISE ON
THE VIRTUES qu. 58, art. 5. Aquinas specifies that the natural law can and
does change over time in several respects. ST. THOMAs AQUINAS ON LAW AND
JUSTICE qu. 94, art. 5. He concludes that "[t]he general principles of the
natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the
great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws
among various people." Id. at qu. 95, art. 2, reply to objection 3. See also
id. at art. 3. All citations are to the SUMMA THEOLOGICA, the First Part of
the Second Part thereof.
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least psychologically if not logically, to be a natural default
position in an era of stridence and confusion. Relativism may
seem to allow us to avoid the discomfort of moral and legal
controversy. This is of course an illusion. While the relativist
may disable herself from making at least certain kinds of moral
and jurisprudential criticisms of questionable, if not horrifying,
conduct and beliefs, the relativist must recognize that it is always
logically open for her to be subjected to all sorts of depredations
at the hands of other perfectly consistent relativists.
Nor is relativism, in either its moral or legal versions, a
position that can somehow logically excuse itself from the task
of seeking to establish its own merits. The relativist, insofar as
she believes that relativism is uniquely true, presumably is
committed to showing that competing doctrines such as
objectivism and noncognitivism are false or unacceptable. This
requires affirmative, reasoned argument. This task, it seems fair
to say, has not yet been successfully discharged by the leading
academic moral relativists. Nor can the task be avoided by
arbitrarily clinging, in an ad hoc way, to a belief that a few of
one's favorite moral beliefs are objectively, and not merely
relatively, true. Any such unprincipled compromise must prove
unstable over the long term.
It is admittedly unfair to ask the courts to justify at a
genuinely philosophical level such legal relativism as their
decisions display. It is not unfair, however, to ask the federal
courts in particular to, for example, reconsider the extent to
which the federal Constitution itself builds in or requires
relativism or subjectivism, in light of the variety of pragmatic
disadvantages of relativism discussed in this essay.
It is certainly possible in the abstract to welcome the enhanced
influence of moral relativism in the law, despite what has been
suggested above. There may be certain areas of the law where
moral relativism may seem attractive to many. The problem,
though, becomes one of trying to cabin the influence of moral
relativism in a principled way. Why, for example, should the
relativist not go on consistently to conclude that the morality
of such matters as the distribution of marital assets upon divorce
is inescapably relative to relevant reference groups involved,
such as divorcing husbands and divorcing wives? To object on
moral grounds to an apparently unfair property distribution' 0
101. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sirucek, 712 P.2d 769 (Mont. 1985) (wife,
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would, under relativism, be merely to announce passionately
and autobiographically which contending side one happened to
identify with. The option of denouncing the property distribution
as genuinely unfair in some familiar, serious sense of the term
would, under relativism, have been forfeited. Obviously, the
availability of the language of objective moral wrong by itself
hardly guarantees the redress of such wrongs. But it is far from
obvious that the loss of such language is a price we should be
willing to pay.
age 52, awarded less than 20% of net marital assets upon dissolution of 12
year marriage, essentially in the form of her own teacher's retirement pension
benefits, where she contributed substantially, financially and otherwise, to the
support of the money-losing ranch awarded to husband, age 63 and in good
health at time of divorce).
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